Demand of long-term care and benefit eligibility across European countries by Carrino, Ludovico et al.
Received: 20 June 2017 Revised: 26 March 2018 Accepted: 27 March 2018RE S EARCH ART I C L E
DOI: 10.1002/hec.3665Demand of long‐term care and benefit eligibility across
European countriesLudovico Carrino1,2 | Cristina Elisa Orso2 | Giacomo Pasini2,31Department of Global Health and Social
Medicine, King's College London,
London, UK
2Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari
University of Venice, Venice, Italy
3NETSPAR, Networks for Studies on
Pensions, Aging and Retirement, Tilburg,
The Netherlands
Correspondence
Giacomo Pasini, Department of
Economics, Ca' Foscari University of
Venice, Cannaregio 873, F.ta S.Giobbe,
Venice 30121, Italy.
Email: giacomo.pasini@unive.it
Funding information
Economic and Social Research Council,
Grant/Award Number: ES/P000487/1;
Fondazione Farmafactoring, Grant/Award
Number: Research Award 2015JEL Classification: 36; 13; 14The authors wish to thank Eric Bonsang, Mau
vious versions of this paper. The paper benefite
of Trieste, the University of Bologna, and the
Fondazione Farmafactoring (Research Award
from SHARE Waves 1 and 2 (DOI: 10.6103/S
SHARE data collection has been primaril
RII‐CT‐2006‐062193, COMPARE: CIT5‐CT‐20
No. 227822, and SHARE M4: No. 261982). A
the Advancement of Science, the U.S. N
R21_AG025169, Y1‐AG‐4553‐01, IAG_BSR06‐
acknowledged (see www.share‐project.org).
Health Economics. 2018;1–14.Abstract
In this paper, we study how elderly individuals adjust their informal long‐term
care utilization to changes in the provision of formal care. Despite this is
crucial to design effective policies of formal elderly care, empirical evidence
is scant due to the lack of credible identification strategies to account for the
endogeneity of formal care. We propose a novel instrument, an index that
captures individuals' eligibility status for the long‐term care programs
implemented in the region of residence. Our estimates, which are robust to a
number of different specifications, suggest that higher formal care provision
would lead to an increase in informal care utilization as well. In the context
of current theoretical economic model of care use, this result points to the exis-
tence of a substantial unmet demand of care among older people in Europe.
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The demand of long‐term care (LTC) by elderly Europeans is growing rapidly due to an unprecedented demographic
transition fueled by declining mortality and fertility rates. The health economics literature recently started to focus
on how the elderly population might adjust the amount of care provided informally by relatives and friends (informal
care) as a response to changes in the amount of care provided by public institutions (formal care), as this information
would be crucial to design effective care programmes and informal care supports and services. Should total demand for
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2 CARRINO ET AL.overall care utilization would remain almost constant. The rate at which formal and informal care are substituted
depends on the rate of substitution between the two goods, that is, on individual preferences for each type of care. Vice
versa, economic theory predicts that if the amount of care provided formally and informally does not satisfy the total
demand by the vulnerable elderly, increasing subsidized provision may induce to increase informal care (Stabile,
Laporte, & Coyte, 2006).
Formal and informal care utilization are likely to be simultaneously determined (Van Houtven & Norton, 2004). In
addition, the formal care receipt may be correlated with unobserved health characteristics and preferences for care,
which are likely to affect also the demand for informal care services (Bonsang, 2009; Carrieri, Di Novi, & Orso, 2017;
Charles & Sevak, 2005). Thus, a source of exogenous variation of formal care utilization is needed to identify a causal
effect on informal care. We exploit the between‐country heterogeneity in the eligibility rules for publicly‐provided
domiciliary LTC and the within‐country variation in health conditions to identify the effect of formal on informal care.
The interaction between individual health conditions and country‐specific legislation is the trigger for causal identifica-
tion: The individual eligibility status varies both because of different health conditions across subjects and because of
different assessments of the same health conditions across programmes. As a matter of fact, in the highly heterogeneous
set of European LTC regulations, individuals with similar clinical profiles may be eligible under some programmes
yet not under others. As an example, a Belgian–Walloon and a German citizen with three limitations in instrumental
activities of daily living (iADLs) and two in activities of daily living (ADLs)—a common profile for the European elderly
population—may be alternatively eligible in Belgium or in Germany only, depending on the specific combination of
iADL and ADL lost.
Compared to previous research, our approach has two main advantages: First, we introduce a new legislation‐based
instrument, exogenous to individual decisions regarding informal care utilization. Second, our identification strategy
does not rely on formal care price changes, allowing us to interpret results within the relevant theoretical literature.
We use comparative microdata from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and
construct a dichotomous individual variable identifying individuals who are eligible for public formal home care, based
on LTC regulations implemented in their area of residence. We show that receiving formal home care positively and
significantly affects informal home care provision from family and friends.
The paper is organized as follows.We first discuss the endogeneity issue and the identification strategy.We then present
the SHARE dataset as well as our regulation‐based instrument (Section 3). Section 4 describes the empirical specification,
whereas results are presented in Section 5. Robustness checks are performed in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.2 | ENDOGENEITY OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL CARE
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) acknowledges that protecting the right to a life
in dignity of frail older people is becoming a major policy challenge and defines LTC as a range of services required by
persons who cannot cope with basic ADL due to a reduced degree of physical or cognitive capacity (OECD, & Commis-
sion, E, 2013). Such services are frequently provided in the form of medical services such as nursing care, prevention,
rehabilitation, or palliative care services, as well as lower‐level care related to domestic help or less demanding tasks.
LTC can be provided at the recipient's own dwelling (home‐based/domiciliary care) rather than in nursing homes or
residential care facilities (residential/institutional care).
It is common to differentiate the LTC assistance between formal care, which includes care services provided within
the context of formal regulations (paid out‐of‐pocket or through public reimbursement), and informal care, which,
conversely, refers to the unpaid assistance provided by respondent's partners, children, relatives, and friends.
Most of the empirical work has focused on how a change in the informal care utilization can affect the probability
and/or the intensity of receiving formal care, stemming from the family decision‐making model developed by
Van Houtven and Norton (2004). Typical findings are that informal and formal home care are substitutes (Bolin,
Lindgren, & Lundborg, 2008; Van Houtven & Norton, 2004),1 whereas a positive relation is found when restricting
the analysis to skilled formal care or for recipients with high vulnerability levels (Balia & Brau, 2013; Bonsang, 2009).
The literature looking at the causal effect of a change in the availability of formal care on the demand of informal
care is scant. Stabile et al. (2006) developed a choice model of household decision making with respect to caregiving
provision and the utilization of subsidized and not subsidized home care services. Their model suggests that an increase1Lo Sasso and Johnson (2002) find similar results for residential care.
CARRINO ET AL. 3in subsidized home care keeping input prices fixed (i.e., without changing market price for professional care, the unitary
subsidy nor market wages) allows to substitute formal care paid out‐of‐pocket with the subsidized one, therefore reduc-
ing the average formal care price. More precisely, formal care can be bought from private providers (M2, at a price P), or
from public sources (M1, at a unitary cost P − S, where S is subsidy). Publicly provided formal care is rationed: Each
individual can consume up to a maximum amount m. The household maximizes utility under a budget constraint
(labour earnings can be allocated between expenditures in formal care and other consumption goods) and a time allo-
cation constraint (time is divided between leisure, work, and caregiving activities). Private and public formal care are
assumed to be equally productive in care provision and normal inputs in the care receiver health production function.
The model delivers clear empirical implications for policy changes affecting the quantity of publicly provided care m
holding prices constant (i.e., holding P, S, and the market wage constant). If the household exhausts all the publicly
provided care (M1 = m) and additionally buys private care (M2 > 0, M = m + M2), then increasing m will increase
the household nonwage income (the fraction of subsidized formal care increases), leading to an increase of informal
caregiving. If, conversely, the household consumes public care at its limit (M1 = m), but does not purchase private care
(M2 = 0), increasing the generosity of the public home care programme will lead to a reduction of informal care
provision. They validate the model on Canadian data and use three province‐level variables (share of 65+ population,
provincial spending on education, and province tax rate) as instruments for generosity of the public home care.
Doubts were raised by Golberstein, Grabowski, Langa, and Chernew (2009) on the validity of the proposed
instruments. Balia and Brau (2013) develop a latent factor model and estimate it on SHARE data aiming at correcting
the endogeneity bias without the need for an individual‐level instrument, which they highlight as particularly difficult
to be found. Finally, Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996) use data from the U.S. “Channelling” experiment and find
that informal care provision is not reduced in the presence of public subsidy of formal care.
We follow a different approach, exploiting individual‐specific information on eligibility status to local subsidized
programmes of home‐based care. A similar econometric strategy has been often proposed in the local average treatment
effects literature (Kroll & Lampert, 2011), though only Kim and Lim (2015) implement it in the LTC framework, using
data from South Korea. The authors use administrative individual information on eligibility and apply a regression
discontinuity design: They find no evidence of a statistically significant impact of home care on child caregiving. In
Europe, publicly provided LTC is either free of charge or subject to relatively low copayments. Therefore, in line with
Stabile et al. (2006), we look at the effect of a variation in the total amount of publicly provided care holding
prices constant.
Access to formal home care is largely not discretionary for older adults in Europe: Regulations of most public
programmes define eligibility by comparing an applicant's “vulnerability profile” with some “requirements for objective
vulnerability” (Brugiavini, Carrino, Orso, & Pasini, 2017). Objective vulnerability often consists in a nonlinear aggrega-
tion of information on functional (e.g., ADL and iADL tasks) and cognitive limitations, yet such algorithms are highly
heterogeneous within and between countries, in terms of what outcomes are included in the vulnerability profile and of
weights assigned to each outcome. As a consequence, the same clinical profile may result eligible for formal home care
provision under one regulation yet not under others.
We construct an individual‐specific dichotomous eligibility index, which identifies individuals fulfilling the mini-
mum requirements of any LTC programme implemented in their region or country, and we use it as an instrument
for the potentially endogenous regressor. This allows us to avoid the well‐known weak‐instrument issues of policy
evaluations based on discrete policy variations affecting specific population subgroups (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995).3 | DATA, DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE, AND SAMPLE SELECTION
We pool observations from the first two waves of SHARE, a multidisciplinary survey on European individuals aged
50‐plus and their spouses, conducted in 2004 and 2006. SHARE contains detailed information about respondents'
morbidity and disability status, based on self‐reports of objective limitations and health conditions. Respondents are
asked to report their dependency status in performing 14 ADLs2 that conform to the ADL and iADL taxonomies by
Katz, Downs, Cash, and Grotz (1970) and Lawton and Brody (1969), as well as in specific mobility limitations. All
the aforementioned limitations are assessed on a dichotomous scale (present or not), but no intensity is measured.2These are (a) dressing, (b) walking, (c) bathing, (d) eating, (e) getting in and out of bed, (f) using the toilet, (g) using a map to determine how to get
around in a strange place, (h) preparing a hot meal, (i) shopping for groceries, (j) making telephone calls, (k) taking medicines and following medical
prescriptions, (l) doing work around the house, (m) managing money, and (n) suffering from urinary incontinence.
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Whole
sample Austria Germany France
Belgium
Flanders
Belgium
Wallonia
Observations 7,781 1,075 2,178 2,048 1,673 807
Receiving formal personal/nursing care (%) 10.7 5.3 3.8 17.8 11.7 16.7
Receiving informal care from any provider (%) 19.9 22.1 22.6 16.4 18.8 21.3
Receiving informal care from children (%) 15.3 17.3 17.8 12.5 14.5 15.1
Annual hours formal personal/nursing home care 12.9 31 9.5 8.9 13.5 6.7
Annual hours informal care (any provider) 88 97 103 79 89 59
Annual hours informal care from children 67 80 87 57.2 60 39.8
Age 73.4 73.1 72.4 74.2 73.9 73.8
Aged 80+ (%) 18.5 17.3 14 22.2 19.5 20.8
Females (%) 54.7 59.4 50.6 57.5 53.4 54.9
Years of education 10.1 9.1 12.3 8.4 9.8 10.1
Number of children 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.58
At least 1 ADL lost (%) 18.8 16.8 15.7 20 18.9 27.3
At least 1 iADL lost (%) 22.2 23.1 17.8 24.5 20.6 30
At least 1 ADL & 1 iADL lost (%) 11.8 11.3 9.4 12.6 11.4 17.3
# mobility deficits (out of 10) 1.9 2 1.94 2 1.6 2.3
Orientation impaired (%) 1.3 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.1 1.4
EURO‐D score 2.3 2 2 2.8 2.1 2.8
Note. Data from SHARE Waves 1 and 2 for Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+, with children (no coresidence), not
institutionalized. ADL = activities of daily living; iADL = instrumental activities of daily living.
4 CARRINO ET AL.Depression and loss of orientation are covered by two different sets of variables. First, the EURO‐D index (Prince et al.,
1999) is offered, whose values range from 0 to 12. We interpret a value of 4 (or higher) as being associated with a
clinically significant level of depression (Colombo, Llena‐Nozal, Mercier, & Tjadens, 2011). Second, four questions on
mental orientation and coherence ask respondents to report the current date, month, year, and day of week; following
Castro‐Costa et al. (2007), we label as impaired (orientation impairment) those respondents who gave zero or one
correct answers. This information allow us to build individual clinical profiles comparable with the LTC regulations
of the selected countries (see Brugiavini et al., 2017).
As for LTC services, SHARE Waves 1 and 2 (unlike successive waves) detail the frequency of both formal and
informal domiciliary care. Respondents are asked whether they made use of any formal personal care (publicly or
privately provided), domestic help, or meals‐on‐wheels services in the last 12 months because of health problems
and, if any, the average number of weeks (per year) and of hours (per week) of care received. We limit our analysis
to average annual hours of personal and nursing care, the most demanding type of help that is commonly regulated
by the public sector (domestic help may indeed include some tasks performed by private workers to seniors not in
need‐of‐care). Meals‐on‐wheels are measured in weeks of service per year: Given the difficulties in aggregating it with
the former type of care and its limited diffusion, we excluded it from the analysis.
With respect to informal care, recipients indicate whether the caregivers are their children, relatives, friends, or
neighbours, the frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, or annual) and the average number of care hours received. We thus
build a continuous variable for the average annual hours of informal care use.3 Finally, we highlight that SHARE does
not include quantitative information about the intrahousehold assistance (by, e.g., spouse and children).
We also exploit information on chronic conditions that the individual may suffer from, on labour market and
economic status, on education (both the ISCED classification—see OECD, 1999—and the number of years of completed
education), and on respondents' children.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the baseline estimation sample selection.
We selected noninstitutionalized individuals aged 65 and older, having children, but not living with them, as in, for
example, Balia and Brau (2013), Bonsang (2009), Kalwij, Pasini, and Wu (2014).43We follow Bolin et al. (2008) in the way we map SHARE questions about intensity of care into average annual hours.
4SHARE lacks information on any informal support provided by people living in the same household. Individuals without children can be expected to
receive a large support from their spouse when they are vulnerable. Therefore, we exclude them from the sample as, for example, in papers by Bolin
et al. (2008), Bonsang (2009) and Balia and Brau (2013).
TABLE 2 Summary of vulnerability outcomes included in assessment‐of‐need scales
ADL Non‐ADL
Bathing & hygiene ✓ Communication ✓
Dressing ✓ Shopping for groceries/medicines ✓
Using the toilet ✓ Cooking ✓
Transferring ✓ Housework ✓
Continence ✓ Doing laundry ✓
Feeding ✓ Moving outdoor ✓
Moving indoor ✓ Responsibility for own medications ✓
Hygiene for post‐surgery conditions or advanced medications ✗ Behavioural/Cognitive impairment ✓
Other mobility limitations ✓
Note. ✓ = information available in SHARE; ✗ = information missing from SHARE. The underlined tasks do not belong to the Katz's ADL scale but are treated
as basic activities of daily livings in the LTC regulations that include them. The category “hygiene for post‐surgery conditions or advanced medications” refers to
patients with difficulties in performing advanced medications such as enemas or maintenance of tubes/bags resulting from surgical operations. Additional
mobility limitations include, for example, crouching and walking down stairs. ADL = activities of daily living; LTC = long‐term care.
CARRINO ET AL. 5We include observations from countries were LTC regulations are “carer‐blind,” and no role is played by other
factors such as informal care availability, family environment, social network, or neighbourhood (Eleftheriades &
Wittenberg, 2013): Austria, Belgium (divided into Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), Germany, and France.53.1 | The eligible population
Table 2 lists in detail the vulnerability dimensions that are taken into account in the assessment of need process to
determine the eligibility status. We split these measures in two groups. The ADL group resembles the taxonomy
introduced by Katz et al. (1970), whereas the non‐ADL is a residual set that includes iADL and cognitive/behavioural
limitations. Each LTC programme directly assesses a different subset of these outcomes and builds an “eligibility index”
for each claimant, through different nonlinear and nonadditive algorithms.
SHARE respondents provide self‐reported information about each of these health conditions; thus, a clinical profile
πi, r, c can be built for a generic individual i living in country c and region r (the online Appendix details the correspon-
dence between SHARE and the actual regulations). It is worth highlighting that the “eligibility” status does not neces-
sarily identify those who are actually “treated” by public programmes; furthermore, SHARE lacks information on
whether or not an individual made an application for LTC benefits. Finally, medical evaluators who take the decision
on eligibility may deviate from the strict application of laws and guidelines. We assume those deviations are not system-
atic. This is an important assumption: The fact that evaluators may deviate systematically from the law had been
documented in previous literature (Maestas, Mullen, & Strand, 2013). Still, we think that the specific dataset at hand
makes this assumption credible in our context. We have individuals from different countries and, within countries, from
different regions. LTC regulation, the way the evaluation committees are composed, and evaluation procedures vary
across countries, if not even across regions. As we will explain in Section 4, all the proposed specifications include a full
set of regional dummies to account for unobservable effects common to individuals from the same region, including sys-
tematic deviation of medical evaluators facing the region‐specific LTC regulation. The remaining unobservable variation
in the deviations from the strict application of diverse LTC legislations can be safely assumed to be idiosyncratic.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on care utilization by the eligible population, compared with a generic sample of
individuals with some functional limitations, the whole sample, and the sample of noneligible elderly. The eligibility
status identifies a subsample that is notably different from an arbitrary selection of “dependent” individuals, where
the definition of dependency is fixed‐for‐all.
Formal care users are over 44% among eligible individuals, 24% among the functionally impaired and 10% in the
whole sample. Moreover, the eligible population—very much unlike the other samples—exhibits similar incidences
as well as closer levels of intensity of formal and informal care received. Finally, 7.7% of noneligible respondents report
receiving formal care, with an average of three care hours per year (compared to 124 hr per year in the eligible sample).
As discussed in Carrino and Orso (2015), there are at least two reasons, besides measurement error, for observing this
pattern: First, formal care, as it is asked in SHARE, includes privately paid care not publicly provided. Second, the5Monetary resources are sometimes taken into account to determine the amount of the benefits, but they do not have discriminatory power to define
eligibility. Details are available in the online Appendix.
TABLE 3 Care utilization among subsamples
Eligible
Individuals with
1+ ADL, 1+ iADL Whole sample Noneligible
Observations 640 2278 7,781 7,141
% individuals receiving:
formal care (%) 44.3 24.1 10.7 7.7
informal care from any provider (%) 43.2 33.9 19.9 17.9
informal care from children (%) 37.1 27.9 15.3 13.4
Average annual hours of:
formal care 124 41 13 3
informal care 409 205 88 60
informal care from children 329 161 68 44
formal care (among receivers) 313 201 140 46
informal care from any provider (among receivers) 945 603 442 334
informal care from children (among receivers) 897 584 444 333
Age 79.3 76.4 73.4 72.9
Number of ADL lost 2.7 1.2 0.4 0.15
Number of iADL lost 3.2 1.65 0.5 0.24
EURO‐D score 4.4 3.56 2.3 2.1
Orientation impaired (%) 11.2 3.1 1.3 0.4
Note. Data from SHARE Waves 1 and 2 for Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+, with children (up to 4;
no coresidence), not institutionalized. F tests on interactions between regions and health controls in linear regression of the eligibility indicator on the
full set of region‐fixed effects, the health variables used to build the eligibility indicator and a full set of interactions. ADL = activities of daily living;
iADL = instrumental activities of daily living.
6 CARRINO ET AL.eligibility index is based on main home care programmes regulated at national or regional level yet not also at
municipal‐level, because the exact municipality of residence is not available in SHARE due to non‐disclosure policies.4 | ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
We investigate the effect of receiving formal home care on the utilization of informal care, both at the extensive margin
(i.e., the probability of receiving informal care) and at the intensive margin (i.e., the amount of care received). Similarly
to previous studies (Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Duan, Manning, Morris, & Newhouse, 1983; Van Houtven &
Norton, 2004), we adopt a two‐part model (2PM) to model the demand for informal care: First, the individual decides
whether to use informal care or not. Then conditional upon receiving informal care, the amount is determined. This
model is appropriate for estimating actual outcomes, that is, fully observed variables. This is exactly our case: Zero
values for informal home care indicate that no care was received, and we regard them as corner solutions because hours
of care cannot be negative.
The first part of the 2PM is a probit for the probability of receiving informal care. We estimate the following
regression:
I TIHCi;r
  ¼ γ0 þ γ′1HSi;r þ γ′2CVi;r þ γ3 log FHCi;r
 þ γ4Rr;c þ εi;r; (1)
where I(TIHCi, r) is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the total amount of informal care received by individual i, from
region r is greater than zero; the key regressor is log of hours of formal home care log(FHCi, r).
6 Other regressors include
socio‐demographic covariates, namely, years of education, residential area (big city, suburbs, and large/small town),
region‐specific household income, and wealth quintiles. Moreover, we control for the same health status variables
(HSi, r) that determine eligibility, that is, a binary variable for mobility limitations, the number of ADL and iADL losses,
and an interaction term between mobility and ADL to capture the combined effect between having at least one mobility
limitation and the number of ADL limitations. Furthermore, we include binary indicators for being disoriented in space
and time and for being depressed (i.e., having a EURO‐D score greater or equal than 4). Finally, we include regional6In line with previous studies (e.g., Bonsang, 2009; Pezzin et al., 1996), a unit was added to the natural hours of formal care before the log transfor-
mation to avoid the problem of zero hours.
TABLE 4 Medical profiles evaluated under the eligibility rules of Belgium–Wallonia and Germany
Profile A Profile B Profile C Profile D
Limited in 2 ADL, 3 iADL Limited in 2 ADL, 3 iADL Limited in 2 ADL, 3 iADL Limited in 3 ADL, 3 iADL
Age 74 85 74 84
Limitations in ADL Dressing
Bathing
Dressing
Transferring
Incontinence
Bathing
Bathing
Eating
Using the toilet
Limitations in iADL Outdoor movement
Using the telephone
Managing money
Meal preparation
Shopping for groceries
Housework
Outdoor movement
Shopping for groceries
Housework
Shopping for groceries
Housework
Managing money
Cognitive limitations Yes No No No
Eligibility status Eligible only in Belgium Eligible only in Belgium Eligible only in Germany Eligible only in Germany
CARRINO ET AL. 7dummies Rr in order to control for unobserved confounding effects between local legislations and LTC eligibility rules.
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In order to account for the simultaneity in the individual decision regarding formal and informal care use, log(FHCi, r) is
instrumented with the eligibility status dummy described in Section 3.1; thus, Equation (1) is estimated by IV probit
through the two‐stage residual inclusion approach. In the first stage, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is per-
formed with log(FHCi, r) as dependent variable and the full set of included exogenous variables, plus the eligibility index
as regressors. We obtain the residuals from the first stage and include them as an additional regressor in the second
stage probit alongside the original endogenous variable and the remaining controls (Deb, Norton, & Manning, 2017;
Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008). In order to control for correlation among unobservables for individuals living in the
same regions, we cluster the standard error at the regional level. Given that the number of clusters is at most 36, we
follow Kline and Santos (2012) and Cameron and Miller (2015) and obtain the standard errors with wild bootstrap.
The second part of the model is a linear regression run on the conditional sample of care receivers where the
dependent variable is a logarithm of hours of informal care, with the same regressors as in (1):
log TIHCi;r
  ¼ γ0 þ γ′1HSi;r þ γ′2CVi;r þ γ3 log FHCi;r
 þ γ4Rr;c þ εi;r: (2)
Again, log(FHCi, r) is instrumented with the eligibility status dummy; Equation (2) is estimated by two‐stage least
squares and standard errors are obtained with the appropriate wild bootstrap method (Cameron & Miller, 2015).
Consistency of our estimates hinges on two assumptions: the independence between the first and second stage,
typical of a two‐part model, and the validity of our instrument. As regards the former assumption, following Dow
and Norton (2003) and Duan et al. (1983), the 2PM is often preferred to Tobit and Heckman selection models in the
health economic literature because compared to a Tobit model, the 2PM does not impose any constraint on the
coefficients, while not relying on any exclusion restriction or functional form, as in a Heckman model.
The eligibility index we construct is the result of a highly nonlinear function of individual health conditions and
regional eligibility criteria. It is a valid instrument if it is informative and exogenous. Informativeness lies on the high
heterogeneity in the algorithm and weights embedded in each programme's eligibility rules (Brugiavini et al., 2017). An
illustration on why this is the case is provided in Table 4. Here, we show how the eligibility status of similar clinical
profiles strongly differs depending on, for example, the regulations of Belgium–Wallonia and Germany. In
Belgium–Wallonia, eligibility is granted through the National Institute for Sickness and Disability Insurance to
individuals limited in washing and dressing or disoriented in time and space; a further care benefit (Assistance to
Elderly People, APA) is granted to individuals scoring at least 7 points on a scale that evaluates some ADL, iADL,
and cognitive limitations. In the German Pflegeversicherung, eligibility requires a minimum overall daily need of
90 min of help for ADL and iADL, with at least 45 min attributable to ADL, whereas cognitive limitations did not
account in the evaluation until 2012. We selected profiles characterized by two/three limitations in ADL and iADL;
we report their age and the presence of cognitive limitations. Profiles A and B are eligible under the Walloon
regulations, the remaining ones under the German rules.
Indeed, being incontinent is explicitly accounted for in Germany but not in Wallonia (Profile C). Moreover, the
Belgian's APA gives the same weight to ADL and iADL, whereas Germany assigns outcome‐specific need‐of‐care
allotments (with ADLs having higher weights) and requires that ADL difficulties account for minimum 45 min of care:7Namely, we include regions at NUTS 1 level (Eurostat's Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics).
8 CARRINO ET AL.This explains why Profiles A and B are not eligible in Germany. Conversely, bathing and eating have the highest
weights in the German but not in the Belgian rules, hence the outcome of profile D.
The exogeneity of the instrument comes from its legislation‐based nature: The way a legislation evaluates a specific
combination of health outcomes should not directly affect the demand for informal care, if not through its effect on
formal care use. However, the strength of such hypothesis could be weakened when the nature of the LTC programmes
is mixed between in‐kind and in‐cash: The utilization of the latter is characterized by a higher degree of freedom and
could, partially result in the compensation for informal caregivers. As a robustness check, we will re‐estimate our model
on a subset of countries and regions where we can use the sole eligibility for in‐kind LTC as an instrument for care use.
Furthermore, although eligibility clearly affects the probability of receiving care, it is not simply a different proxy for
formal care use, as the sample includes both eligible individuals not receiving any of it, and noneligible ones who do
(Table 3).
Finally, in order to control for potential correlation in unobservables among individuals living in the same region,
we cluster the standard error at the NUTS1 level. Given that the number of clusters is at most 36, we follow Cameron
and Miller (2015) and obtain the p values through wild bootstrap methods (and the score bootstrap suggested by Kline
and Santos (2012) for probit models).5 | RESULTS
Table 5 reports the first‐stage regression estimates at both the extensive and the intensive margin.
The first‐stage outcome shows that the individual's eligibility status for public programmes of domiciliary assistance
is a strong predictor for the log hours of received formal home care. The estimated coefficient for eligibility is positive,
with a wild‐bootstrapped Quasi‐F statistics of 8.3, significant at the 1% level. It is useful to recall that the reported F‐stat
cannot be interpreted in the light of the weak instruments cut‐offs proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997)—that is,
checking whether the test statistic is greater or smaller than 10—as they were developed for the simpler case of IID
errors (Cameron & Miller, 2015).TABLE 5 First stages of the IV regression for the extensive and intensive margins
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Formal care utilization (annual log hours) Formal care utilization (annual log hours)
Dependent variable marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E.
Being eligible 0.499 *** 0.173 0.499 0.319
Age 0.013 *** 0.003 0.013 *** 0.005
Being retired 0.035 0.023 0.032 0.123
Female 0.039 0.037 0.006 0.111
Living with spouse −0.095 ** 0.036 −0.267 *** 0.073
Years of education 0.016 0.033 0.076 0.073
Euro‐D 0.031 0.023 0.072 0.067
Low orientation‐score −0.414 * 0.177 −0.398 0.457
Any mobility deficit 0.008 0.026 −0.036 0.046
# ADL limitations 0.058 0.076 0.323 * 0.104
# iADL limitations 0.171 *** 0.040 0.188 ** 0.066
Mobility*ADL 0.138 0.079 0.025 0.111
Living area (w.r.to rural)
Big city −0.048 0.058 −0.210 0.131
Suburbs big city 0.002 0.056 −0.074 0.117
Large town −0.017 0.040 −0.043 0.108
Small town −0.004 0.029 −0.018 0.076
Observations 7,781 1,556
Note. Additional controls include dummies for regions, income, wealth, and wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing care and personal care
assistance at the patient's home. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from Waves 1 and 2 from SHARE, having children but not living with them. Standard
errors are clustered at the regional level (37 clusters at the extensive margin, 36 at the intensive). p values are obtained using the wild cluster bootstrap method
(Roodman (2017)), with 1,000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and Miller (2015).
*p value < .1; **p value < .05; ***p value < .01.
TABLE 6 Two‐part model for overall informal care from outside the household: intensive and extensive margin
Any informal care received Log hours of informal care, among receivers
Probit IV probit OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E.
Log‐hours FHC 0.016 *** 0.004 0.118 ** 0.056 0.058 * 0.025 0.676 ** 0.240
Age 0.007 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.019 ** 0.007 0.010 0.008
Being retired 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.015 −0.093 0.078 −0.128 * 0.078
Female −0.001 0.010 −0.004 0.010 0.126 0.099 0.129 0.098
Living with spouse −0.212 *** 0.014 −0.202 *** 0.018 0.009 0.130 0.176 0.143
Years of education −0.009 *** 0.009 −0.010 0.008 −0.153 ** 0.057 −0.198 *** 0.056
Euro‐D 0.044 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.010 0.134 * 0.076 0.075 0.080
Low orientation‐score −0.053 * 0.032 −0.020 0.042 0.114 0.195 0.311 0.208
Any mobility deficit 0.074 *** 0.012 0.073 *** 0.013 0.130 0.070 0.149 * 0.072
# ADL limitations 0.044 0.019 0.035 0.022 0.057 0.185 −0.159 0.183
# iADL limitations 0.028 *** 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.259 *** 0.035 0.116 * 0.056
Mobility*ADL −0.064 ** 0.019 −0.082 *** 0.016 −0.038 0.187 −0.083 0.192
Living area (w.r.to rural) −0.042 0.155
Big city −0.003 0.021 0.002 0.020 −0.166 0.149 −0.124 0.107
Suburbs big city 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.018 −0.171 0.107 0.017 0.169
Large town 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.013 −0.005 0.166 −0.107 0.114
Small town −0.004 0.011 −0.004 0.011 −0.114 0.114
Observations 7774 7774 1556 1556
F test excluded instrument ‐ 8.3*** ‐ 2.5
Test of exogeneity 3.25* 7.1**
Note. Additional controls include dummies for regions, income, wealth, and wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing care and personal care
assistance at the patient's home. Informal home care from outside the household by children, relatives, friends and neighbours corresponds to unpaid help with
personal care, practical household tasks, and paperwork. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from Waves 1 and 2 from SHARE, having children but not
living with them. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level (37 clusters at the extensive margin, 36 at the intensive). p values are obtained using the
wild cluster bootstrap method (Roodman (2017)), with 1,000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and Miller (2015). None of the seven
observations from French regions “Midi‐Pyrénées” and “Corse” report use of informal care; therefore, they are dropped due to collinearity.
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
CARRINO ET AL. 9Table 6 reports the marginal effects for the determinants of informal home care from children, relatives, friends, and
neighbours at both margins.
The coefficient for formal care use in the instrumented model is positive and significant at the 5% level. The Wald
test for exogeneity of formal care can be significantly rejected at the 10% level, indicating that the decisions on using
formal and informal assistance are simultaneously determined. A 10% increase in the annual hours of personal/nursing
care leads to a 1.19% increase in the probability of receiving informal assistance. Being 19.9% the average probability of
receiving informal care, a yearly increase of formal assistance by 10% would increase the average likelihood of informal
care use to 20.8% with respect to the unconditional mean.
Comparing the results with a noninstrumented model, the sign and significance of the coefficient of interest are not
affected, whereas the point estimate of the IV probit is 10 times bigger than its noninstrumented counterpart due to the
simultaneity bias.
The second part of the model—the intensive margin—is the equation for the yearly log hours of informal care
received from any provider (conditional to receiving any) and is estimated both by 2SLS (with eligibility status as
instrument) and by OLS (assuming exogeneity of formal care). The null hypothesis of exogeneity as per the modified
Hausman test (Cameron & Miller, 2015) is rejected with a p value of 2.4 (F‐stat = 7.1), thus indicating that decisions
about hours of formal assistance (conditional on receiving) are endogenously determined with respect to informal care.
The first‐stage of the 2SLS reports an F‐statistics of 2.5 for the excluded instrument, thus signaling that the combination
of a reduced sample size and a large set of controls make the instrument become weak. In Section 6, we show results
form a modified specification with a health index in place of the single health characteristics where the instrument does
not appear to be weak. The 2SLS estimates for yearly log hours of formal home care in Table 6 confirm the lack of
crowding out of informal care by the formal care: An increase of 1% in the intensity of formal care provision actually
leads to an increase of 0.7% in the intensity of informal care, among those who receive it. Table 6 reports also the
TABLE 7 Subsample of in‐kind programmes only, for France and Belgium–Wallonia
Any informal care from children Log hours of informal care, among receivers
Probit IV probit OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E. marg. eff. S.E.
Log hours FHC 0.006 0.005 0.153** 0.046 0.045 0.032 0.735 0.736
F test excluded instrument 3 0.7
Test of exogeneity 6.13** 0.8
Observations 2,848 2,848 508 508
Note. Additional controls include socio‐economic and health status, regions‐, income‐, wealth‐, wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing care and
personal care assistance at the patient's home. Informal home care from outside the household by children, relatives, friends, and neighbours corresponds to
unpaid help with personal care, practical household tasks, and paperwork. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from Waves 1 and 2 from SHARE, having
children but not living with them. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level (eight clusters). p values are obtained using the wild cluster bootstrap
method (Roodman (2017)), with 1,000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and Miller (2015). None of the seven observations from
French regions “Midi‐Pyrénées” and “Corse” report use of informal care; therefore, they are dropped due to collinearity.
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
10 CARRINO ET AL.noninstrumented estimates of the second part. As for the extensive margin, sign and significance are preserved, but OLS
point estimate of the coefficient of interest is 10 times smaller than the 2SLS one.
According to Stabile et al.'s (2006) theoretical framework, a positive coefficient can be found between the use of
formal (private + subsidized) and informal care only if the status quo scenario is characterized by the existence of an
unmet demand for public LTC, satisfied resorting to the private market: Households exhaust all the available public
formal care, they then determine the hours of informal care but must supplement informal and subsidized care with
formal care bought on the market. Thus, in the words of the aforementioned authors, our results highlight that
“the extension of public coverage may meet some previously unmet need, and thereby, increase overall utilization as
these services complement existing care.”6 | ROBUSTNESS
Throughout the paper, we made the hypothesis that the eligibility for LTC benefits (in‐kind or in‐cash) would affect
directly the take‐up and conditional use of formal care services, and only indirectly informal care. It may be argued that
cash benefits may be used to compensate informal caregivers directly. In the main specification, we did not restrict the
analysis to in‐kind LTC benefits in order to have a sufficiently large sample to allow for a rich set of covariates. We
re‐estimate our model on a narrower geographic selection where we could use the eligibility rules for in‐kind LTC
programmes as instruments, namely, France and Belgium–Wallonia8 to show that results are not affected by the in‐kind
or in‐cash nature of the public LTC benefits. Table 7 summarizes our results for the France + Wallonia sample, where
only eligibility rules for in‐kind LTC are used as instruments for formal care utilization.
At the extensive margin, our results are confirmed and exogeneity is rejected. At the intensive margin, results are not
significant because we do not have enough observation to precisely estimate the baseline specification with its
demanding set of controls. All in all, we feel confident to enlarge our eligibility rules to the full sample of available
countries and LTC programmes in order to be able to estimate precisely our rich baseline model.
As recent literature mostly focused on informal care from children only, we run our model on a dependent variable
that accounts for the sole assistance provided by respondent's children, grandchildren, and children‐in‐law living
outside the household (Table 8).
At both intensive margins, unlike in our main specification, the exogeneity of formal care cannot be rejected, as
found by recent analyses on SHARE with a similar sample selection (Bonsang, 2009). Moreover, although the marginal8Indeed, the France LTC programmes are entirely in‐kind in nature (Joël, Dufour‐Kippelen, Duchêne, and Marmier (2010)). Within Belgium, where
LTC is predominantly provided as a service in‐kind (Willemé (2010)), the Belgian Wallonia is characterized by the national in‐kind programme of
home care provided by the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (INAMI‐RIZIV), complemented by an allowance for assistance to
elderly persons (APA), which is part of several allowances for the handicapped. We then use the Wallonia sample and compute the eligibility index
based only on the rules that refer to the in‐kind programme, namely, INAMI‐RIZIV. We exclude the Flanders region were the LTC programmes are
more cash oriented, as well as Germany and Austria, where LTC benefits are mixed in nature between in‐cash and in‐kind.
TABLE 8 Two‐part model of informal home care provision from children only
Any informal care from children
Annual log hours of informal home care received
from children, among receivers
Probit IV probit OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E.
Log hours FHC 0.009 ** 0.004 0.062 0.047 0.067 * 0.024 0.522 * 0.337
F test excluded instrument 8.3*** 2.1
Test of exogeneity χ2(1) = 1.05 2.66
Observations 7,776 7,776 1,184 1,184
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.274 0.072
Note. Additional controls include socio‐economic and health status, regions, income, wealth, and wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing care
and personal care assistance at the patient's home. Informal home care from children corresponds to unpaid help with personal care, practical household tasks,
and paperwork. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from Waves 1 and 2 from SHARE, having children but not living with them. Standard errors are
clustered at the regional level (37 clusters at the extensive margin, 36 at the intensive). p values are obtained using the wild or score cluster bootstrap method
(Roodman (2017)), with 1,000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and Miller (2015) and Kline and Santos (2012). None of the seven
observations from French regions “Midi‐Pyrénées” and “Corse” report use of informal care; therefore, they are dropped due to collinearity.
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
CARRINO ET AL. 11coefficients associated to formal assistance are positive and significant at both parts for the noninstrumented model,
no or weaker statistical significance emerges when we account for endogeneity.
These results are in line with Kalwij et al. (2014): Informal caregivers are likely to be substitute among them, and the
allocation of care needs to different providers is likely to be a two‐step decision: Care receivers first determine jointly the
total amount of formal and informal care they need to meet their demand for care, and then they allocate the informal
care provision to the different potential providers.
Because SHARE lacks quantitative information on intrahousehold assistance, we perform two robustness analyses
regarding spousal‐ and cohabiting children support. First, we restrict our sample to singles only in order to avoid
potential underestimation of informal caregivers (Balia & Brau, 2013; Bolin et al., 2008). Although the significantly
reduced sample size weakens our instrument, the main results remain substantially unchanged (Table 9).
Second, we allow for parent–children cohabitation by including all individuals having at least one child living
outside the household and including a dummy for cohabitation as in Bonsang (2009). We confirm our main findings
(Table 10) and detect endogeneity at both margins.
Finally,we implemented several specifications inwhichwe varied the set of regressors. First,we estimate a set ofmodels
where controls are subsequently included (Table 11). Starting with formal care utilization (fc) as the sole independent
variable, we add (a) regional dummies, (b) health variables, and (c) demographics. As Table 12 illustrates, the coefficient
for formal care is always significantly different from zero at all margins, with the instrument being relevant in almost allTABLE 9 Two‐part model for the population of single only
Any informal care from children,
relatives, and friends
Annual log‐hours of informal home care from
children, relatives, and friends (among receivers)
Probit IV probit OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E.
Log‐hours FHC 0.029 ** 0.009 0.114 0.111 0.059 ** 0.026 0.760 *** 0.216
Testing the null of formal care
exogeneity
χ2(1) = 0.36 F(1, 35) = 10.79***
First‐stage weak‐instrument test F(1, 35) = 3.26 F(1, 35) = 2.43
Observations 2,502 2,502 1,010 1,010
Note. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level. Additional controls include socio‐economic and health status, regions,
income, wealth, and wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing care and personal care assistance at the patient's home. Informal home care from
outside the household by children, relatives, friends, and neighbours corresponds to unpaid help with personal care, practical household tasks, and paperwork.
Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from Waves 1 and 2 from SHARE, having children but not living with them. Standard errors are clustered at the regional
level (37 clusters at the extensive margin, 36 at the intensive). p values are obtained using the wild or score cluster bootstrap method (STATA command boottest by
Roodman (2017)), with 1,000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and Miller (2015) and Kline and Santos (2012).
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
TABLE 10 Two‐part model for the population aged 65+, including households with cohabiting children
Dependent variable
Any informal care from children,
relatives, friends
Annual log hours of informal home care from
children, relatives, friends (among receivers)
Probit IV probit OLS 2SLS
marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E. marg. coeff. S.E.
Log hours FHC 0.015 *** 0.004 0.15 ** 0.065 0.068 ** 0.025 0.644 ** 0.274
Testing the null of formal care
exogeneity
χ2(1) = 4.5* F(1, 35) = 4.55*
First‐stage weak‐instrument test F(1, 36) = 6*** F(1, 35) = 2.23
Observations 8,258 8,258 1,672 1,672
Note. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level. Additional controls include socio‐economic and health status,
regions, income, wealth, and wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing‐ and personal‐care assistance at the patient's home. Informal home care
from outside the household by children, relatives, friends and neighbours corresponds to unpaid help with personal care, practical household tasks and paper-
work. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from waves 1&2 from SHARE, having children. At least one child lives outside the household. Standard errors are
clustered at the regional level (37 clusters at the extensive margin, 36 at the intensive). P‐values obtained using the wild or score cluster bootstrap method
(Roodman (2017)), with 1000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and Miller (2015) and Kline and Santos (2012). None of the seven
observations from French regions “Midi‐Pyrénées” and “Corse” report use of informal care; therefore, they are dropped due to collinearity.
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
TABLE 11 Alternative sets of explanatory variables
Extensive margin (IV probit) Intensive margin (2SLS)
Dependent variable Informal care utilization (dummy) Informal care utilization (log‐hours)
Specification
Marginal
coeff. fc
Instrument
strength
Exogeneity
test (Wald)
Marginal
coeff. fc
Instrument
strength
Exogeneity test
Wu Hausman
fc only 0.130*** 61.88 33.68***** 0.638*** F = 33.80*** 125.45***
fc + region 0.132*** 31.91*** 52.82*** 0.657*** F = 27.55*** 105.32***
fc + region + health 0.131** 9.53*** 3.68* 0.657** F = 2.80 6.50***
Full model:
fc + region + health + demographics
0.119** 8.3** 3.25* 0.705* F = 2.50 7.1
Number of obs. 7,774 1,556
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
TABLE 12 Alternative health measures
Dep. variable: informal
care utilization
Marginal coefficients for yearly log‐hours of formal home care
Probit
coeff
IV probit
coeff
F test weak
instr.
Exogeneity
test χ2(1)
OLS
coeff
2SLS
coeff
F test weak
instr.
Exogeneity
test F(1, 1468)
With disability index 0.01*** 0.03** 52.1*** 12.7*** 0.13*** 0.55*** 22*** 54***
All health dummies 0.01** 0.16 2.6* 2.18* 0.046* 1.1** 0.65 5.7**
Note. Additional controls include socio‐economic and health status, regions, income, wealth, and wave effects. Formal home care corresponds to nursing care
and personal care assistance at the patient's home. Informal home care from outside the household by children, relatives, friends, and neighbours corresponds
to unpaid help with personal care, practical household tasks, and paperwork. Sample selection: individuals aged 65+ from Waves 1 and 2 from SHARE, having
children but not living with them. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level (37 clusters at the extensive margin, 36 at the intensive). p values are
obtained using the wild or score cluster bootstrap method (Roodman (2017)), with 1,000 repetitions and imposing the null hypothesis as per Cameron and
Miller (2015) and Kline and Santos (2012).
*p value < .1, **p value < .05, ***p value < .01.
12 CARRINO ET AL.specifications.Exogeneity isalwaysrejectedatbothextensiveandintensivemargins,withtheonlyexceptionof the fullmodel
at the intensive margin.
Second, because specific functional or cognitive limitations may have different effects on individuals' health and are
weighted differently in some LTC regulations, we tested our results under different strategies of accounting for health
outcomes in the model (Table 12).
We, first, followed Bonsang (2009) and summarized the entire set of health variables with an individual disability
index. This index is constructed on the basis of a categorical variable from the SHARE questionnaire that asks to which
CARRINO ET AL. 13extent, if any, the respondent is limited in his daily activities because of health‐related problem. After estimating an
ordered probit model with the limitation question as dependent variable and out main set of health variables as
explanatory variables, we compute the latent index and define it as the disability level of the respondent. Under this
more parsimonious specification, findings are fully confirmed, and instrument diagnostics are improved.
Moreover, when including a dummy for each ADL/iADL limitation, results are confirmed even though the sample
size is too small to obtain precise estimates due to the larger set of parameters.7 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the effect of a change in the amount of formal home care services on the demand for informal
care by children, relatives, friends and neighbours. We use data from SHARE Waves 1 and 2 for Austria, Belgium,
France, and Germany. We focus on home‐based services; as in Europe, they are now prioritized by policymakers with
respect to residential/institutional care. This causal relationship has been less studied than the opposite one due to the
difficulty of addressing the potential endogeneity of formal care. We propose a novel instrumental variable that exploits
self‐reported health profiles and regional differences in LTC legislation. We therefore instrument the formal care
utilization (nursing/personal assistance, public, and/or private) with the eligibility for public home care programmes.
Hence, we are actually looking at the change in the formal care use that can be attributed to changes in subsidized care.
Adopting a two‐part model for informal care utilization, we show that an increase in formal care use has a positive and
significant effect on the informal care provided by family and friends. The magnitude of such an effect is economically
relevant: A 1% increase of formal assistance would increase the probability of informal care use by 2.1% and by 0.7% the
number of hours of informal care, conditional on receiving informal care.
According to the theoretical framework by Stabile et al. (2006), this result directly points to the existence of an unmet
residual demand for LTC services, as a result of an insufficient supply of public assistance. This is an important result for
policymakers because it clarifies the nature of the issues at stake regarding LTC. The evidence is that throughout Europe,
frail elderly already receive less care than what they would desire. This implies that public, private, and informal care
providers are not substitutes: Policies targeted to incentivize informal care as well as the development of an LTC insurance
market to pay for LTC private service providers will not necessarily reduce the pressure on public finances.ORCID
Giacomo Pasini http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2052-3453REFERENCES
Balia, S., & Brau, R. (2013). A country for old men? Long‐term home care utilization in europe. Health Economics, 23, 1185–1212.
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.2977
Bolin, K., Lindgren, B., & Lundborg, P. (2008). Informal and formal care among single‐living elderly in Europe. Health Economics, 17(3),
393–409. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.1275
Bonsang, E. (2009). Does informal care from children to their elderly parents substitute for formal care in Europe? Journal of Health
Economics, 28(1), 143–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.09.002
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M. (1995). Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the correlation between the
instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90(430), 443–450.
Brugiavini, A., Carrino, L., Orso, C. E., & Pasini, G. (2017). Vulnerability and long‐term care in Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cameron, A. C., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner's guide to cluster‐robust inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), 317–372.
Carrieri, V., Di Novi, C., & Orso, C. E. (2017). Home sweet home? Public financing and inequalities in the use of home care services in
Europe. Fiscal Studies, 38(3), 445–468. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475‐5890.2017.12138
Carrino, L., & Orso, C. E. (2015). 31 Eligibility regulations and formal home‐care utilisation among the vulnerable older people in SHARE
Wave 5. Ageing in Europe‐Supporting Policies for an Inclusive Society, 343.
Castro‐Costa, E., Dewey, M., Stewart, R., Banerjee, S., Huppert, F., Mendonca‐Lima, C., … Prince, M. (2007). Prevalence of depressive
symptoms and syndromes in later life in ten European countries: The SHARE study. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 191, 393–401.
doi:191/5/393 [pii] https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.107.036772
Charles, K. K., & Sevak, P. (2005). Can family caregiving substitute for nursing home care? Journal of Health Economics, 24(6), 1174–1190.
14 CARRINO ET AL.Colombo, F., Llena‐Nozal, A., Mercier, J., & Tjadens, F. (2011). OECD health policy studies help wanted? Providing and paying for long‐term
care: Providing and paying for long‐term care (Vol. 2011). Paris: OECD Publishing.
Deb, P., Norton, E. C., & Manning, W. G. (2017). Health econometrics using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Dow, W. H., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Choosing between and interpreting the Heckit and two‐part models for corner solutions. Health Services
& Outcomes Research Methodology, 4(1), 5–18. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025827426320
Duan, N., Manning, W. G., Morris, C. N., & Newhouse, J. P. (1983). A comparison of alternative models for the demand for medical care.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 1(2), 115–126. https://doi.org/10.2307/1391852
Eleftheriades, C., & Wittenberg, R. (2013). A critical review of international practice on assessment and eligibility in adult social care: Lessons for
England. Retrieved from. Oxford: Centre for Health Service Economics and Organisation (CHSEO).
Golberstein, E., Grabowski, D. C., Langa, K. M., & Chernew, M. E. (2009). Effect of Medicare home health care payment on informal care.
Inquiry, 46(1), 58–71.
Joël, M.‐E., Dufour‐Kippelen, S., Duchêne, C., & Marmier, M. (2010). The long‐term care system for the elderly in France. Centre for European
Policy Studies.
Kalwij, A., Pasini, G., & Wu, M. (2014). Home care for the elderly: The role of relatives, friends and neighbors. Review of Economics of the
Household, 12(2), 379–404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150‐012‐9159‐4
Katz, S., Downs, T. D., Cash, H. R., & Grotz, R. C. (1970). Progress in development of the index of ADL. The Gerontologist, 10(1 Part 1), 20–30.
https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/10.1_Part_1.20
Kim, H. B., & Lim, W. (2015). Long‐term care insurance, informal care, and medical expenditures. Journal of Public Economics, 125, 128–142.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.12.004
Kline, P., & Santos, A. (2012). A score based approach to wild bootstrap inference. Journal of Econometric Methods, 1(1), 23–41.
Kroll, L. E., & Lampert, T. (2011). Unemployment, social support and health problems: Results of the GEDA study in Germany, 2009.
Deutsches Ärzteblatt International, 108.
Lawton, M. P., & Brody, E. M. (1969). Assessment of older people: Self‐maintaining and instrumental activities of daily living. The Gerontol-
ogist, 9(3), 179–186.
Lo Sasso, A. T., & Johnson, R. W. (2002). Does informal care from adult children reduce nursing home admissions for the elderly? Inquiry,
39(3), 279–297. https://doi.org/10.5034/inquiryjrnl_39.3.279
Maestas, N., Mullen, K. J., & Strand, A. (2013). Does disability insurance receipt discourage work? Using examiner assignment to estimate
causal effects of SSDI receipt. American Economic Review, 103(5), 1797–1829.
OECD (1999). Classifying educational programmes: Manual for ISCED‐97 implementation in OECD countries. Paris: OECD.
OECD, & Commission, E (2013). A good life in old age? Monitoring and improving quality in longterm care. OECD Health Policy Studies,
OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi. org/https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264194564‐en
Pezzin, L. E., Kemper, P., & Reschovsky, J. (1996). Does publicly provided home care substitute for family care? Experimental evidence with
endogenous living arrangements. Journal of Human Resources, 31, 650–676.
Prince, M. J., Reischies, F., Beekman, A., Fuhrer, R., Jonker, C., Kivela, S.‐L., … Fichter, M. (1999). Development of the EURO‐D scale—A
European, Union initiative to compare symptoms of depression in 14 European centres. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 174(4),
330–338. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.174.4.330
Roodman, D. (2017). BOOTTEST: Stata module to provide fast execution of the wild bootstrap with null imposed. Retrieved from https://
EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocode:s458121
Stabile, M., Laporte, A., & Coyte, P. C. (2006). Household responses to public home care programs. Journal of Health Economics, 25(4),
674–701. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.03.009
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica, 65(3), 557–586.
Terza, J. V., Basu, A., & Rathouz, P. J. (2008). Two‐stage residual inclusion estimation: Addressing endogeneity in health econometric
modeling. Journal of Health Economics, 27(3), 531–543. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2007.09.009
Van Houtven, C. H., & Norton, E. C. (2004). Informal care and health care use of older adults. Journal of Health Economics, 23(6), 1159–1180.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.04.008
Willemé, P. (2010). The long‐term care system for the elderly in Belgium. ENEPRI Research Report(70).
How to cite this article: Carrino L, Orso CE, Pasini G. Demand of long‐term care and benefit eligibility across
European countries. Health Economics. 2018; 1‐14. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3665
